In this article, I adopt a structural approach to Russian soft power, switching focus from the supposed agent of power (Russia), towards the subjects of power (Ukrainians). I outline the applicability of this approach to empirical studies into soft power, demonstrating how soft power can be examined from bottom-up, discursively-focused perspectives. The empirical analysis then traces how Ukrainians (do not) link their self-identities to discursive understanding of "Russia". Reviewing recent insights into the relationship between soft power and affect, I argue that Ukrainians' cultural, historical and linguistic ties with Russia often lack necessary emotional force to generate meaningful soft power.
demands further scrutiny, not least because (as documented below) many Ukrainians have not entirely abandoned shared cultural and historical identities with Russia and the former Soviet Union. The prominent role of the Russian language, for example, appears to be less politically salient than one might expect, considering the increase in hostility towards Russia itself (Kulyk, 2016, p. 601) .
Research which adopts a top-down, resourceefocused approach to soft power, often skips past these issues, at times conflating manifestations of culture (including language) with soft power proper. Therefore, while the literature is able to pinpoint various weaknesses in Russia's institutionalisation, conceptualisation and implementation of soft power (Rutland and Kazantsev, 2016) , there has been little systematic effort to explain sufficiently why Ukrainians themselves appear relatively immune to Moscow's soft power initiatives. Here, I argue that it is important to move the debate beyond the policies and practices of the Russian Federation, towards the crucial role of the "targets" of soft power.
Taking a bottom-up approach, the ensuing study therefore examines the (non-)effects of Russian soft power in Ukraine. Key to this analysis is the role of emotion, or affect, towards the actual functioning of Ukrainian identities, and their subsequent relationship with Russian soft power. Instead of viewing identities and cultural affinity as being intrinsically tied in with soft power, I argue that cultural proximity and overlapping identities with Russia do not necessarily lead to soft power on their own. Instead, it is important to examine the emotional trajectories that accompany identities.
Overall, data generated from focus group interviews in Kyiv are used to derive three key explanations for the relative weakness of Russian soft power in Ukraine: 1) The competing affective appeal of "Europe"; 2) The increasing salience of a Ukrainian identity which rejects close association with Russian narratives and aesthetics; and 3) The effects of Russia's perceived aggressive foreign policy and information campaign against Ukraine, which significantly undermine shared identificational attachments. This study therefore sheds light on the identificational attachments Ukrainians have towards Russia, but adds the crucial element of affect to this analysis. This, it is argued, helps to explain why shared cultural perspectives and practices do not necessarily equate into soft power.
A bottom-up approach to soft power
The literature has moved on considerably from Joseph Nye's original contribution (1990) , and from his subsequent work which defined soft power as the ability to attract and persuade e in contradistinction to hard power which was the capability to coerce (2004) . In Nye's (2011a, b) book (2011b), he expounds upon his theory by paying closer attention to the nature of power. Nye focuses upon the "three faces of power" now widely identified within the literature, that is, "inducing others to do what they otherwise would not do", "framing and setting agenda", and "shaping others' preferences", (2011b, pp. 90e94) setting out to demonstrate how each face has two dimensions e one coercive (hard power) and one based on attraction (soft power).
While these faces of power are important tools for the study of soft power, Nye neglects the "fourth face of power", largely influenced by the work of Michel Foucault (Digeser, 1992) . The limitation of the first three faces of power is that power is understood in a relational sense (Lock, 2009, pp. 36e7), whereby one actor is able to exercise power over another either directly or indirectly. These approaches therefore give primacy to the agency of the actor who wishes to create power.
The fourth face of power, however, is attuned to the agency of the subject of power (Allen, 2002, pp. 134e136) . Power, in this sense, can be understood as structural rather than relational. It is structural because power surrounds us and does not come from a single actor. Instead, actors live in complex social worlds and have to derive meanings from a range of potential sources (Foucault, 1982, p. 781) . Power consequently proceeds from our interpretations of the world around us and our place within it.
This structural approach consequently opens important avenues for the study of soft power. However, it simultaneously challenges a number of Nye's core assumptions. Nye (2011a, p. 16) goes as far as suggesting that "the insights Foucault and other structuralists provide are purchased at too high a price in terms of conceptual complexity and abstraction." One of the biggest objections is that structuralist approaches obscure the role of agency within power relations, an issue that has been at the heart of scholarly debates into Russian soft power (Feklyunina, 2015, pp. 6e9 ). In the first three faces of power, attraction manifests itself through logical persuasion or "rational" appeals made by concrete actors. For the fourth face of power, power is dispersed and it is impossible to locate a single source of power. Despite criticisms, however, that Foucault leaves little space for human agency (Allen, 2002) , the structural approach can help to focus attention on the agency of subjects who have some latitude to negotiate their own meanings and "truth". This, O'Hara (1992, pp. 134e6) argues, is increasingly apparent in Foucault's latter writings. Structuralist 1 approaches therefore focus on the sociolinguistic functions of language and the way that meanings are negotiated by a broad range of individual actors, that is, the subjects of power. This subject-centred approach to agency also encourages thoughtful reconsideration of the nature of attraction. For Nye, soft power is defined by its capacity to be attractive rather than coercive. Attraction therefore lies at the heart of the concept. However, as Bially Mattern (2005) has pointed out, Nye's central explanations for attraction: attraction as natural and attraction as evidence-based reasoning, are both deficient and underdeveloped.
2 In both cases the problem centres on the assumption that reality and reason are fixed. In practice, though, "interlocutors often don't even share understandings of what
